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Abstract
This thesis explores the nature of the relationship between foreign news media
and network incidents against DoD networks. A rank correlation was performed between
the number of network incidents against DoD networks and foreign news media reports
covering U.S. Military events. Further analysis was conducted to determine the key
terms used in the contents of foreign news media reports for the months the reports were
significantly correlated with network incidents. Several significant correlations were
found between various combinations of regions and categories of network incidents.
However, the correlations were only moderate and the key terms only led to a slightly
better understanding of such relationships.
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DETERMINING A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN NEWS MEDIA
REPORTS COVERING U.S. MILITARY EVENTS AND NETWORK
INCIDENTS AGAINST DOD NETWORKS

I. Introduction
Background
Used for storing, processing, or transferring data, information systems are heavily
relied upon by U.S. military forces for successful operations, such as aerial attacks,
payroll, peace missions, and training. This reliance on information systems is a result of
the advantages of real time information acquisition and processing. Information
superiority is now a core competency of the U.S. Air Force and a necessary attribute of
all military operations. Information superiority is defined in Joint Publication 3-13
(1998) as the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. The DoD
accomplishes information superiority through the implementation of information
operations (IO).
Joint Publication 3-13 (1998) defines IO as actions taken to affect adversary
information and information systems while defending one’s own information and
information systems. Defensive IO guarantees timely, accurate, and relevant information
access while denying exploitation of friendly information and information systems
through policy and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology. A further subset
of defensive IO is information assurance (IA). IA is the protection and defense of
1

information system availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.
IA is carried out for the DoD by NetDefense, also known as the DoD Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT). NetDefense assesses incident data collected from
the Joint CERT Database (JCD) which is populated by all DoD organizations. An
incident is one network attack or several network attacks related to each other through
significant similarities in attackers, techniques, victims, and timing (Howard, 1997). A
network attack is an unauthorized attempt to access a computer, regardless of whether or
not the attempt was successful. Figure 1 illustrates the number of incidents per month
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against DoD networks for the past two years.

Figure 1: Monthly NetDefense statistics on Incidents Reported from January 2002 though
June 2004 (JTF-GNO GNC NetDefense, 2004).
IA is necessary because of the numerous vulnerabilities inherent in information
systems. These vulnerabilities include a lack of reliable intrusion detection tools,
insufficient security manpower, information system complexity and size, and a
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monoculture of tools operating on the information systems (CERT/CC, 2003). Intrusion
detection systems (IDS) are unable to analyze all network traffic because data transfer
rates are too fast and IDS processing speeds are too slow (Allen, Christie, Fithen,
McHugh, Pickel, Stoner, 2000). Furthermore, IDS methods for detecting new types of
intrusions are unreliable because the primary detection method compares old intrusion
data with current data. The more variation between a new attack and older attacks, the
less likely the new attack will be detected. To compensate for the lack of reliability in
IDS, manual detection techniques are also used. However, the increasing number of
attackers and amount of data to be analyzed is a growing burden for a limited security
workforce. The burden on security is further increased because of the size and
complexity of information systems (CERT/CC, 2003). Networks include numerous users
and multiple connections to the internet along with remote servers; each new component
adds to the complexity of the overall system. The complexity is minimized in the DoD
by implementing standardized equipment and procedures for each network. The use of
similar equipment, however, creates a less complex environment for an adversary to plan
an attack against. It is simpler because the attacker would otherwise have to employ
separate attack techniques against different types of operating systems, network routing
equipment, software applications, etc. Regardless of the employment of IDS tools and
improved security procedures, the number of incidents per year has increased steadily for
the past several years.
Some of the reasons for the reported increase in incidents may include the use of
better intrusion detection tools and practices and increased participation in incident
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reporting (CERT/CC, 2003). These factors suggest a greater incident volume
unaccounted for in previous years. Increased participation in incident reporting was due
to the benefits each contributor gained in understanding attack methods by combining
their incident information. This information was used to create better procedures and
tools to detect and deny attacks.
Other reasons for the rising number of network incidents are attacker’s use of
better network attacking tools (Allen, et. al, 2000), the proliferation of the internet, and an
increasing number of potential attackers. User friendly software tools simplify the ability
for an individual to perform a network attack so minimal knowledge of information
systems is needed by the attacker. Figure 2 illustrates the different types of attack tools
created from 1980 through 2000 and the relative amount of intruder knowledge required
to use these tools (CERT/CC, 2003).
“stealth” / advanced
scanning techniques
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packet spoofing denial of service
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Figure 2: Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge (CERT/CC, 2003)
Because it is easy to become an attacker, as more people and organizations connect to the
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internet so does the number of potential attackers. Figure 3 shows how the growth of the
Internet has increased exponentially for the past decade.

Figure 3: Internet domain survey host count (Source: Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
(http://www.isc.org/))
Several motivations exist for people to conduct network attacks. Howard and
Longstaff’s (1998) taxonomy clarifies the possible objectives for network attacks as
“challenge, status, thrill,” “political gain,” “financial gain,” and “damage.” These
motivations have been further validated by Diagle (2001). "Challenge, status, thrill"
groups three similar motivations together. They are combined because in each case the
point of the attack is to do no more then gain access to an information system or bypass
its security. An incident is considered "damage" motivated when unauthorized
modifications or destruction is done to an information system. Some individuals use their
computer skills to gain unauthorized control of an information system and hold it ransom,
destroy it, or steal information in hopes of gaining a market advantage. These types of
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attacks are done for "financial gain." "Political gain" motivations are similar to financial
ones except the results benefit an attacker's government or hinder the victim's
government. The public was made aware politically motivated attacks were occurring
against the U.S. when in 1998 the CIA director, George Tenet, stated other nation's
governments are funding network attacks against the United States (Yurcik, Loomis, and
Korzyk, 2000).
The news media has been the public’s primary source for information on
government actions since the time of the revolutionary war (McHugh, 1997). The
information supplied by the news media gives the American public the knowledge of the
U.S. government to make necessary decisions or take actions concerning the U.S.
government. Therefore, media reports may have a direct influence on the actions of the
public (Hill, 1997). Both the U.S. government and its adversaries have taken advantage
of the effects the media has on public opinion to gain political advantage (Snyder, 2003).
Furthermore, media reports may contain sensitive DoD information which our
adversaries could use to their advantage (McHugh, 1997).
DoD public affairs policy has been created to supply the news media with the
support it needs for effective reporting and counteract the potential threats created by the
news media. Within the policy are guidelines on how to include the media when
planning military operations so the public remains well informed, but not give up
sensitive information. When the news media gains access to sensitive information it is
expected to be secured through self controlled reporting guidelines held by the media
(Snyder, 2003). Censorship is still used, but its use is minimized because of the lack of
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trust it generates between the government and the public (McHugh, 1997).
It is possible there may be sensitive information being reported not yet known to
the DoD. The DoD needs a better understanding of what information should be
considered sensitive if this is true. In addition, the number of effects media reports have
on public opinion is not fully understood. A better comprehension for the effects media
reports have on public actions could lead to improved policy and guidance to reduce
negative results.
Problem Statement
DoD officials need to know whether media reports involving military events
influence the number of incidents occurring on DoD systems. Network operators need to
better prepare DoD information systems against network attacks and DoD officials need
better media relationship policies if a relationship is determined to exist. The purpose of
this research is to determine what relationships exist between foreign news media
coverage of military events and DoD network incidents through qualitative codification
and quantitative statistical analysis of data collected by NetDefense and the Foreign
Broadcast Information System (FBIS) for the same time period. The hypothesis being
tested is whether or not a correlation exists between the frequency of foreign news media
reports of military events and the frequency of DoD network incidents. The null
hypothesis is that no correlation exists.
Research Questions
What is the nature of the relationship between foreign news media reports
covering U.S. military events and network incidents against DoD networks?
7

Investigative Questions
To better answer the research question, this research proposes to answer the
following investigative questions:
1. Do statistically significant correlations exist between different foreign regions
of news media reports involving U.S. military events and different categories
of DoD network incidents?
2. During what timeframes do the most statistically significant correlations
occur?
3. What is the content of the news media reports for the timeframes that are most
significantly correlated?
Problem Approach
Data for this research was gathered through the collection of the most recent
historical incident data available within the timeframe of this research maintained by
NetDefense and a qualitative analysis of eight regions of foreign news media reports
maintained by FBIS from January of 2002 to June of 2004. The relationship between
each category of incident and news from each foreign region is explored separately to
take into account the different possible types of correlations the media may have with
DoD network incidents, both positive and negative. The qualitative analysis of media
reports was done through the use of a data mining tool, IN-SPIRE. The IN-SPIRE
software is used to quantify the number of foreign news media reports containing military
events for each day of the study. By using the JMP 5.1 statistical software to perform
the Spearman’s Rank Test for correlation, the foreign news media and DoD network
8

incident data were analyzed to determine the existence of any correlations. IN-SPIRE
was then used to determine the most significant content of the media reports.
Scope
The point of this research is to find attributes in foreign media reports correlated
with network incidents against DoD networks. This research will utilize the most recent
daily DoD incident data collected on the JCD attained from NetDefense along with daily
foreign media reports acquired from the FBIS for the time period of January 2002 to June
2004. The two and a half year time span will provide a thorough sample of recorded
DoD incident data and foreign news media reports. This research does not attempt to
suggest what security policy or procedures should be implemented, but investigates the
possible correlation between foreign news media reports involving military events and
DoD network incidents.
The growing expansion of the internet has made geographical boundaries
irrelevant. Because of the internet, network attackers are able to assault any network
connected to the internet from virtually anywhere on earth. Therefore, a complete
collection of foreign media reports is used for the same time period as the network
incident data in this research. Once any significant correlations are found to exist and the
content of the news media ascertained, or if no correlations exist, the research will be
completed. The practitioner may therefore be able to use the information and determine
how the results affect their operations.
Each service, and some individual agencies, maintain a separate network
emergency response team to track and repair incidents against their systems. The
9

incident data from each service is collected on the JCD for further analysis and reporting.
For this research the combined data from the JCD attained from NetDefense is used
rather than data for each service. One service may have a higher correlation than the
other services, but first a correlation should be determined to exist. Data exists for
civilian incidents, but it is excluded because this research focuses on information relevant
to DoD operations and civilian incident reporting procedures are not as well established
as in the DoD.
This research encompasses six of the eight categories of network incidents
tracked by the DoD. Of the two categories not employed, incidents classified as
“unknown” are excluded because they have yet been properly understood and put into a
more meaningful category. Incidents in the category “poor security practice” are also
excluded because they are the result of user error. In other words, "poor security
practice" incidents are the result of actions not taken to properly secure an information
system and fall outside the scope of this research. The remaining six categories
(unauthorized access, unauthorized user access, unsuccessful attempted access, denial of
service, unauthorized probe, and malicious logic) will be analyzed against the media
reports.
Assumptions & Limitations
This research hopes to discover a relationship among DoD network incidents and
foreign news media reports covering military events by comparing existing DoD network
incident data and foreign media archives. Due to the extremely irregular nature of
network incidents, several other factors that affect the number of incidents on DoD
10

systems could create enough interference to conceal any correlation. As an example, one
of the tools used to determine if an incident has occurred, intrusion detection systems
(IDS), are far from being a truly accurate measurement device of network incidents
(Allen et. al, 2000).
While an abundant number of foreign news media archives exist, it is beyond the
abilities and resources of this research to consider every national and international source
of media. Rather, this study assumes the over 3000 sources of foreign news media
collected and archived by FBIS will be a sufficient sample of foreign news media. The
exclusion of media reports from within the United States is assumed not to be a
contributing factor to any correlations with other international regions, but may be a
consideration for follow-on research.
Because the data are non-parametric, Spearman’s Rank test is required to
determine a correlation. One potential problem with Spearman’s Rank test is when the
data have a large number of tied data points relative to the entire data set. When a tie
occurs each number is given the same rank based on the amount of numbers with the
same value. The result may skew the results of this research. In addition, the values for
some of the data sets may fail to reflect a continuous distribution of the two variables
being measured. Category I, II, IV incident data and the military related media reports
per week data have small values for the samples making this assumption less then ideal.
Several more ties may occur as a result. However, the vast accumulation of data within
the databases and the large amounts of data for each week seems to satisfy the
assumptions required for the Spearman’s Rank test. Furthermore, Spearman’s test uses
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the t-distribution to determine the significance of any correlations. Therefore the validity
of a Spearman Rank test depends on a normal distribution of correlation values for the
population.
A final limitation is the use of IN-SPIRE to determine the content of media
reports. The ability of the IN-SPIRE tool to separate and extract media reports
containing U.S. military events from the collection of foreign media is also a potential
limitation to this research. Various forms of military operations exist with vague
definitions making it difficult to perform a query accurately extract the entire collection
of military related news reports. This is especially difficult when the number of news
media reports is extremely large, such as the thousands of documents used for this
research. Furthermore, while the techniques used to determine the primary content of
correlated media reports will be effective and provide valuable insight, they are far from
validated with this being the first time IN-SPIRE will be used for research in this manner.
Research Overview
The remaining chapters of this thesis provide the details of this research. Chapter
II contains the literature review, which explores the existing body of knowledge pertinent
to this research topic. Chapter III describes the method used and assumptions made to
analyze the data. Chapter IV provides the findings of the analysis performed on the data.
Finally, Chapter V discusses the finding, presents conclusions, and makes
recommendations for further research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The intent of this chapter is to give the reader a brief review of relevant material
concerning the two factors of this research: foreign news media reports covering military
events and network incidents against DoD systems. The problem of determining a
correlation among the news media's coverage of military events and network incidents is
specific yet includes a wide range of topics. Consequentially, only a few research papers
exist to use as the basis of this research. The majority of information relating to this
research problem consisted of a historical review of network security, the past and
present relationship between the news media and the military, DoD network and news
media policy, and the effects the media can have on the public.
For the purpose of this thesis the terms “media coverage,” “network incident,”
and “military events” need to be clarified. “Media coverage” is any form of publication
or broadcast widely distributed throughout a region. Media coverage can therefore take
many forms: radio, magazines, newspapers, television, and so forth. The term “network
attack” is defined as the unauthorized attempt to view, change, or corrupt information
contained on a computer system. A “network intrusion” is a successful attack that results
in an attacker having gained access to a network system. A “network incident,” however,
is a collection of attacks that share some commonalities, such as a particular victim or
goal. Incidents can be distinguished from other incidents because of the sites attacked,
techniques used, and individuals performing the attacks. Incidents range from a simple
probe of a computer system to the complete destruction of all contents of several
13

computer networks. Finally, “military events” is defined as any action conducted by the
U.S. military.
Computer and Network History
This section presents an overview of relevant history concerning information
systems, the Internet, and reasons these systems are vulnerable to network attacks.
Within this history it is shown how security and distribution of information are inversely
proportionate to one another. This section concludes with a brief review of IDS history
and its usefulness as a tracking tool for network attacks.
Information System Technology
Information systems have always proven to be more of an asset then a risk, but as
technology has progressed the level of risk compared to the benefits of information
systems has increased. Security measures for information systems thirty years ago, such
as the mainframe computer, were not as big a concern as they are today. Physical
measures were more then capable of handling potential attackers because the information
could only be accessed from a single location. Once physical security wasn’t sufficient
manual auditing became the primary source for ensuring the availability and integrity of
information system assets (Witkin, 1995). As the amount of data stored on information
systems increased manual auditing became too labor-intensive to be effective. However,
the small number of skilled individuals capable of performing a successful attack on
information systems minimized the chances an attack would occur on any one system.
The advantages of worldwide data communication outweighed the threats of using
information systems.
14

At this point in time security wasn’t a large concern. Because of its size the
information system, called a "mainframe," was centrally located within an organization.
The central location simplified maintenance and the security of the mainframe computer,
only the rooms containing a mainframe computer needed to be secured (Witkin, 1995).
Security was even less of an issue because access to the mainframe was only allowed by
a small group of computer operators. An attack would have to be initiated by one of the
few employees who had access to the system.
In the late 1970s the computing process was decentralized by smaller and cheaper
information systems, called PCs (Witkin, 1995). More people now had access to
information processing, but it was at the cost of reduced security. More information
systems meant increased vulnerability. Security was no longer centralized to a single
physical location and accountability became increasingly difficult with the growing
number of PC users. Internal threats, such as disgruntled employees, were the largest
threat to an information system.
Initially, the only way to share data between PCs was physical media, such as a
floppy disk. As PCs became more dispersed throughout an organization users wanted an
efficient way to share data (Witkin, 1995). Physical media was a threat to system
security, but a bigger threat occurred when user demand led to the interconnection of
multiple information systems to form networks. This allowed transfer of information
directly between information systems. The addition of each new connection added
another potential vulnerability or threat to the overall system.

Manual auditing became

increasingly difficult because of the amount of information on a system plus the amount
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of information being passed between systems.
Network security was again degraded when the geographical limitations of
potential attackers were removed through distributed architectures which allowed more
users access to information systems from vast distances. The initial distributed
architecture was called a local area network (LAN) which encompassed an area no larger
than the size of a city block. The use of LANs eventually led to the development of a
network that permitted communication within an area the size of an entire city. These
types of networks were called Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN) (Witkin, 1995).
Eventually global communication networks were developed, called Wide Area Networks
(WAN). Communication protocols for the WANs, MANs, and LANs were not
standardized, separate phone lines were leased to handle the data transfer for each
network. Therefore an attacker would have to know what type of communication was
being used on a network and also be able to gain physical access to the network
communication lines.
Internet Technology
The goal of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) in
1969 was to develop a common communications protocol to increase the speed and
robustness of government digital communication networks. The security for ARPANET
wasn’t a primary concern because only U.S. government agencies had access to it. In
1986 the ARPANET was handed over to the National Science Foundation (NSF) and
expanded to include users from the private sector forming what was called the “Internet.”
The Internet expanded quickly as organizations realized its benefits. Many
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advantages exist for using the Internet over a WAN, such as cost and convenience, the
primary disadvantage being security. A connection to the existing internet is
considerably cheaper than leasing the communication lines necessary for a WAN, but this
meant openly sharing communication lines. The Internet is also more durable then a
WAN because of the multitude of interconnections message traffic can be routed through,
yet the interconnections threaten security since all other users are connected to the same
communication lines (Lipson, 2002).
In late 1988 the first reported major incident occurred on the Internet. The
incident was a computer program called a worm which caused information systems to
lockup fooling them into attempting to connect to nonexistent IP addresses. This
effectively shut down use of the Internet. Even with the devastating effects caused by the
single malicious attack the advantages of using the Internet outweigh the risk. This is
true even as the number of users grew and the potential for malicious activity became
more of a concern. To make matters worse, security was difficult to improve upon
because Internet standards had already been well established (Lipson, 2002).
Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection became necessary in the early 1970s when network
connectivity began to threaten information security (McHugh, 2001). Intrusion detection
was initially done through manual auditing of computer logs. Manual auditing worked
well during the 1970s because computer systems could be accessed only by a small group
of users and computer logs were small enough to be manually inspected. However, as
the amount of data increased and the number of connections grew the task of manual
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auditing became effectively inconceivable (McHugh, 2001).
As the threat of network attacks grew, organizations began to implement
additional security measures in addition to manual auditing to counteract the threat. A
prevalent tool used to counteract the threat of attacks was the intrusion detection system
(IDS). IDSs are automated auditing tools used to collect and sort data such as logs or
transmissions from a network or computer system then alert administrators when that
data contain characteristics of an intrusion (McHugh, 2001). The fundamental method of
comparing known attack data with current network traffic data for intrusion detection,
around since the early 1980s, is still the primary basis for intrusion detection today.
Unfortunately, IDSs are too slow to keep up with network traffic and unreliable when
distinguishing new types of attacks (Allen et. al, 2000). Because of there limitations,
attacks detected by an IDS on an information system can only be considered a portion of
the actual number of attacks.
Past Incident Prediction Research
The problem of determining a correlation among foreign media coverage of
military events and network incidents is specific yet includes a wide range of topics.
Though most information relating to this research problem did not pertain to correlation
analysis the few existing research articles found using incident data to predict future
incidents were the basis of this research.
There are three research documents that address incident analysis as a method to
reduce future incidents: Ginn, 2001; Yurcik, Loomis, and Korzyk, 2000; and Korzyk,
1998. This is understandable considering how narrow the topic is and the lack of valid
18

and reliable metrics in the past. Each paper focused on the reactive nature of network
security and the desire to create more proactive security tools and procedures. Although
this research considers a much wider range of potential effects of the foreign media and
incident data then attempted before, the existing research provided a solid basis for this
study.
Korzyk (1998) developed a forecast model using historical incident data to predict
future incident volume. A forecasting model has many similarities to a correlation
analysis, both require use of statistical analysis to compare past data and find trends or
similarities. Once significant trends are discovered the data can be used to create a model
and predict future trends or determine the causes of the trends. Korzyk’s (1998) research
found a slight seasonality correlation and additional trends in the incident data. He used
several forecasting models to find the best fit for predicting incident data, but none were
successful enough to be of significant use. Korzyk’s notice of incident trends did show
evidence some types of correlations and predictions may exist for incident data.
Yurcik, Loomis, and Korzyk (2000) focused their research on how incidents were
detected and reported. Several problems exist with analyzing incident data: growth of the
Internet, changing technology, low reporting rates for security incidents, false alarms
rates, and the changing nature of Internet attacks (Yurcik, et. al, 2000). The problems can
be minimized if proper metrics are used. The following is a list of metrics suggested by
Yurcik et. al (2000):
•
•
•
•

Type of Internet attack based on a common taxonomy
Number/percentage of Internet attack frequency growth
Number/percentage of detected/undetected Internet attacks
Number/percentage of successful/unsuccessful Internet attacks
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Number/percentage of reported/unreported Internet attacks
Number/percentage of automated Internet attacks
Types of automated Internet attacks – tools used/ports probed
Stationarity of Internet attacks over time (day/day of week/month/year/season)
Duration of Internet attacks (day/month/year)
Number of hosts involved in Internet attacks
Damage Cost estimate for distinct Internet attacks
Geographical location (physical and virtual mapping) of Internet attacks
Targeted systems (location/organization/vendor/operating system)

This is a list of potential metrics that would help prevent incidents, not an actual list of
current metrics. Most organizations have different lists of metrics which depends on their
methods of incident reporting (Yurcik et. al, 2000). The lack of a standard set of network
incident metrics hinders the ability to determine if correlations exist among the combined
incident data. Furthermore, advanced intrusion tools and distributive attack techniques
allow attacks to be performed in a chaotic manner in which a correlation would be harder
to discern (Yurcik et. al, 2000).
Patrick Ginn (2001) did a regression analysis and discovered no correlation
between incidents tracked by the Fleet Information Warfare Center and United States
foreign media exposure for the year 1999. He used the IN-SPIRE software to quantify
the number of media reports per week related to the United States. However, a
regression test does not work well when determining a correlation with highly fluctuating
data sets. Also, Ginn (2001) only used foreign media documents that contained the exact
phrase "United States" and combined the incident data from categories I, II, III, IV, VI,
and VI for his analysis. Incident analysis methods and intrusion detection techniques
during this time were not well established. As a result incident data were not as well
documented. Fortunately for this research, the methods used by the DoD to analyze and
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categorize intrusions have become much more consistent in recent years.
DoD Network Incident Metrics
Network incident data used in this research was attained from the Joint CERT
Database (JCD). The JCD is a collection of various defense agency incident data used by
NetDefense. NetDefense is also known as the Department of Defense Computer
Emergency Response Team (DoD CERT) who falls under the Joint Task Force Global
Network Operations (JTF-GNO) agency which works to protect, defend, and restore
elements of the global information grid. The JCD incident data contains eight categories:
unauthorized access, unauthorized user access, unsuccessful attempted access, denial of
service, poor security practices, unauthorized probe, malicious logic, and unknown
(Table 1).
Table 1: Incident Category Description
Category Description
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII

Unauthorized Root Access
Unauthorized User Access
Attempted Access
Denial of Service
Poor Security Practice
Probe or Scan
Malicious Code
Unknown

Each category is specific to a type of network incident described as follows.
Unauthorized root access and unauthorized user access describe the type of privileges an
attacker gains for an information system. They encompass a range of incidents from
improperly logging into a user's account, such as a hacker logging into a legitimate user's
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account, to obtaining unauthorized access to files and directories. Unauthorized root
access incidents occur when access is gained to a system with root privileges without
authorization. Unauthorized user access incidents occur when access with user privileges
is gained to a system without authorization.
Unsuccessful attempted access is the next type of network incident tracked by the
DoD. Unsuccessful attempted access is defined as repeated attempts to gain access as
root or user on the same information system from the same source. Tracking these types
of incidents shows how successful safeguards of DoD systems are in incident prevention
and produce information on attacks volume.
Successful disruptions of network operations are labeled “denial of service”
incidents. More specifically, denial of service incidents are unauthorized actions which
preempt or prevent any part of an information system from functioning properly, such
actions include destruction, modification, or degrade performance of a system or network
affecting the mission, business, or function of an organization.
An unauthorized probe is any attempt to gather information about an automated
information system or its users on-line by scanning a site and accessing ports through
operating system vulnerabilities. Probes can be used by attackers to find out information
about a network for a future or ongoing attack.
Finally, the category of malicious logic incidents are the most obvious and
disruptive attacks caused by hidden hardware, software, or firmware that is intentionally
included in an information system for an unauthorized purpose. Malicious logic software
is self-replicating and disseminated by being attached to or mimicking authorized
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computer system files, such as a Trojan horse, worm, malicious scripting, or a logic
bomb. The effects of malicious logic attacks include but are not limited to simple
monitoring of traffic, corruption of information, disclosure of information, theft of
service, and automated backdoors with full system rights.
The two categories “poor security practice” and “unknown” can be separated
from the other six categories for the following reasons. “Poor security practice” metrics
are actions of the victim not the attacker, such as uninstalled software security patches.
“Unknown” incidents are yet to be classified into one of the other seven categories,
therefore “unknown” is not an actual incident category itself. However, most “unknown”
incidents are later reclassified into “denial of service” incidents (Svetlev, 2004).
Therefore, because neither poor security practice nor unknown incidents can be, at least
yet, considered direct actions of an attacker the data from these categories are not
included in this research.
Howard’s (1997) original taxonomy of network attacks divides the method of
access to a network into two groups of users, those that are not authorized access and
those that are not authorized use. However, Howard and Longstaff’s 1998 taxonomy
(Figure 4) does not directly distinguish between these two categories. Rather, Howard
and Longstaff (1998) eliminate the access category and refer to attacks as having
unauthorized results. This improves the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
properties of their taxonomy but fails to address the importance of access metrics, as was
verified by Daigle (2001). Knowledge is gained from breaking down access
characteristics of network attacks.
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Howard and Longstaff’s (1998) taxonomy continues to segregate network attacks
by their unauthorized results: increased access, disclosure of information, corruption of
information, denial of service, and theft of information. One of these results (denial of
service) is tracked by the "denial of service" DoD incident metric. Unauthorized root
access, unauthorized user access, and attempted access DoD incident metrics track the
level of increased access addressed in the taxonomy. Unfortunately, DoD incident
metrics do not break down further which category of incidents address the disclosure,
corruption, or theft of information. While this does limit the scope of this research, it is
not necessary to determine if a relationship exists between foreign news media reports of
DoD events and network attacks against DoD systems.

Figure 4: 1998 Computer and Network Incident Taxonomy
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The Motivations of a Network Attacker
As can be seen in Howard and Longstaff’s (1998) taxonomy the objectives for
network attacks include “challenge, status, thrill,” “political gain,” “financial gain,” and
“damage.” “Challenge, status, and thrill” is a very broad category which encompasses
attacks that may mean no harm, but are done simply to break through the security of a
network system. By contrast, the other motivations are meant to cause either direct or
indirect damage to the system under attack. The purpose of political gain is to gather
information and at the same time deny that information from opponents for the purpose
of gaining an advantage for one’s own government. Motivation for financial gain differs
from political gain because the objective pertains to wealth. Financial gain attacks can
consist of monetary compensation for the safe return of stolen information similar to a
ransom, or steeling information for increased competitive advantage or market share.
Motivation to cause damage results in the types of events seen readily in the media.
“Damage” motivated attacks, such as denial of service or malicious logic attacks are not
as focused on specific networks. Rather, these attacks start at any system on a network
and can spread to all other systems connected to that network. “Damage” motivated
attacks are clarified in depth by Kleen (2001) in her thesis, “A Case Study on Malicious
Hackers.”
A trend in the categorization of motivations which is taken to an extreme by
Jordan and Taylor (1998) is a focus on challenge and status as the primary reasons for
network attacks. The type of hackers that perform network attacks for challenge and
status consist of individuals with an internet connection and the few tools necessary to
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connect into an unauthorized network. This class of attacker is composed of members of
the general public who take the time to learn about the tools and techniques use to
perform network attacks.
Network attack motivations are universal to employees and non-employees.
However, non-employees have additional physical or electronic security measures to
bypass before they can gain access to a system. Employees already have some access to
their organization’s network, which is one reason why the majority of successful attacks
are perpetrated by employees.
DoD Network Policy
There are three forms of policy governing networks within the DoD; they cover
access rights to DoD systems by both DoD personnel and authorized non-DoD personnel,
security of DoD systems, and network connections to and between DoD systems.
DoD Policy on Access to Information
Because the DoD’s function is the security of the nation and its people the
information held within the DoD is the property of U.S. citizens. Therefore, this section
covers government policy on access to DoD information in two parts, one for the general
public, the other for DoD employees.
Public Access to Information
DoDD 5400.7 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) states that in order to promote
public trust, the maximum amount of information about DoD activities should be easily
accessible by any U.S. citizen who requests it. The FOIA allows complete disclosure of
DoD information and activities to the general public, with the exception of any
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information that is private to individuals within the DoD, subject to classification, or
deemed sensitive for reasons of national security. DoD Directive (DoDD) 5230.9, which
clarifies the procedures for declassifying information for public release, states that clear
and accurate information be declassified and distributed as soon as is possible to aid the
public’s understanding of DoD actions and policy.
DoD policy affirms the public should be allowed access to all DoD information
not subject to restrictions for national security. However, DoDD 5230.9 and the FOIA
state access to DoD information must be under the control of DoD personnel.
Unauthorized access by members of the public to DoD unclassified public information is
considered an attack. To avoid any potential problems a request for DoD information
must be handled through the proper procedures.
DoD Personnel Access to Information
DoDD 5200.1 and DoDD 8500.1 require DoD personnel be educated and trained
in the protection and classification of computerized classified information and network
defense techniques. Education and training also clarify the responsibilities of the
individual member in how to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information.
The proper control of information by DoD members is well established in DoD
policy. Guidance on who should be allowed access to sensitive information is outlined in
DoDD 5200.2, DoDD 5200.2R, and DoDD 8500.1. These directives state that no person
should be allowed assess to classified information unless it is in the interest of the
nation’s security. Finally, DoDD 5200.2R stipulates the requirement for all DoD
personnel to have appropriate background checks and training before being granted
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access to DoD computer or network systems.
Information System Security Policy
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5200.40 applies directly to the security of DoD
information systems. DoDI 5200.40 establishes a process to certify and accredit
information systems and verify each one has been checked for security flaws as well as
has an acceptable level of risk. The certification and accreditation (C&A) process
measures security by assessing the level of risk of each DoD owned computer system and
the significance of that system to DoD operations. Tools to measure the significance of
each system and determine appropriate security measures are contained in DoDI 5200.40
as well. The C&A process includes annual evaluations for each system to ensure all
irrelevant information is removed or new information is included on the most recent
C&A.
The C&A process places responsibility on the designated approving authority
(DAA). The DAA is an individual who must have the authority to accept responsibility
and risk of the system. Usually the DAA is an O-6 grade officer or higher assigned
command of an organization which is responsible for the information system. The DAA
verifies and signs that a satisfactory C&A was accomplished. When this process is
carried out properly the information system is considered secured.
Network Connection Policy
DoD networks are allowed connection to outside organizations, such as
international allies, other government agencies, and civilian organizations deemed
necessary for mission accomplishment. Outside access should only be completed with
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the approval of the network DAA who has the responsibility to verify the connection
requirements are necessary for mission accomplishment and are within an acceptable
level of risk (DoD Instruction 8500.1). The term “acceptable level of risk” is rather
obscure for a system connected to an inherently varying level of risk. DoDI 5200.40 and
8510.1M quantify external connection risk by evaluating several factors of both the risk
in using a particular system and the criticality of that system in support of DoD
operations. The more critical a system is to the DoD, such as saving lives and money, the
less risk the DoD will take with that system. Of course, risk can be reduced by increasing
security measures, such as minimizing network connections.
News Media and DoD Relationship
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” How much
freedom the press is allowed is difficult to interpret. Through time our nation's press,
DoD policy regarding the press, and DoD operations have adapted to one another in hope
of reaching a happy medium.
History of the News Media and the U.S. Military
Both DoD and media personnel accept their relationship as vital to maintain our
nation’s freedom (Aukofer and Lawrence 1995). Maj Raymond Hill, Jr. (1997) referred
to the media as the vital link between Carl von Clausewitz Remarkable Trinity of the
people, their government, and their military. This section overviews the history between
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the military and its link to the people, the media.
The Formation of Today’s Relationship
For the U.S. the earliest form of mass media was a majority of opinionated
articles on a single sheet of paper during the Revolutionary War (McHugh, 1997). These
articles didn’t have content restrictions, or rules governing content validity. The uses of
the press were soon found to be beneficial in spreading information, but also a hindrance
when the information was biased or misleading.
The press was more prominent in the Civil War where reporters were included on
the battlefield for the first time in U.S. history. The motivation for the media was the
public's growing desire for information on the war. So strong was this desire that the
military didn’t dare interfere with the media for fear a public uproar. At this point in time
the speed news traveled became faster then military movements, meaning opposing
forces could gain significant intelligence from public news reports (Hill, 1997). The
military had relied on a trusting relationship to keep information like troop movements
and battle plans safe from publication. Eventually this trust broke down and the press
published vital operational information setting up the need for U.S. Government control
of news media actions.
The media’s access to information remained under government control through
the first and second world wars. Regardless of the restrictions, at the time the public and
the media were extremely patriotic so few protests were ever made. The harmony ended
years later during the Vietnam War when censorship was lifted and the media’s coverage
began including subject matter that supporters of the military believed was biased and
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meant to persuade the public to force a premature end to the war. The result was a bitter
relationship between the media and military, both accusing the other of providing
inaccurate or biased information (McHugh, 1997).
To improve the relationship the military began to set policy where news media
involvement became a part of operational planning (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995).
However, most operational planners chose to exclude the media because of their hard
feelings caused by Vietnam War coverage. Most plans continued excluding the needs of
the media through the 70’s and early 80’s. During the Gulf War of the early 1990’s,
military plans began to include the requirements for media coverage, but still failed to
completely encompass the needs of the media. The media also failed to fully understand
the military. Many military members complained of media reporters’ lack of knowledge
concerning the military’s operations and structure (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). The
military continues to improving its relationship with the media today by establishing rules
and principles for both the military and the media to follow, relying on trust to maintain
its effectiveness.
Significance of the Media in the United States
The early press during the Revolutionary War was rudimentary in its collection of
information as well as the reporting of that information. Newspapers were only a page
long and took hours to print a significant number of copies (McHugh, 1997). Although
news was limited, it was thoroughly read by the public (Snyder, 2003). The news media
had difficulty getting information because the slow communication links between where
news was made and where it was published. In the next two centuries a revolution took
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place that drastically reduced the amount of time it took news reports to reach the public.
The public’s desire for news created commercial competition which pushed
advancements in communication and coverage. The media started to use a reporting
technique where a network of affiliates across the nation would be used to cover a large
geographical area at one time. The telegraph and dedicated pony express sped news
across the nation allowing the public to get news of a battle while the battle ensued
during the Civil War. Competition between publishers pushed reporters to put accuracy
and security below the need to get an article published first (Snyder, 2003) (McHugh,
1997). No controls were in place to prevent reporter bias or inaccuracy until the first and
second world wars when heavy censorship was placed on the media. The patriotic news
media accepted the censorship as a necessity of war (Snyder, 2003).
The speed of reporting was greatly increased with the invention of the radio,
which became the primary source of news during WWII providing live war coverage
from across the globe. News coverage traveled ever greater distances through a robust
radio communications system providing faster coverage of ongoing events. However, the
visualization of the news coverage was still primarily limited to the imagination of the
public and the restrictions placed on the reporters.
Television coverage of war began with Vietnam and eliminated the need for the
public to imagine what war looked like. In addition, most restrictions were lifted and
reporters were free to cover events as they saw fit. Live news coverage was still
restricted to radio, but video taken from earlier in the day made that night’s evening news
broadcast. The American public was not ready for the realities of war and was shocked
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by what they saw (Snyder, 2003). Eventually the graphic depictions of war and
inconsistencies between media reports and government statements resulted in a decline in
public support for the Vietnam War (Snyder, 2003). Events like Vietnam demonstrated
the use of the media as a tool in asynchronous warfare. Public opinion was affected by
news media coverage which resulted in a U.S. withdraw, in effect allowing the adversary
to win a battle.
The amount of information readily accessible by the public continued to increase
as television coverage became live with satellite technology and internet coverage during
the early 1990's in the Gulf War. Technology and reporting techniques successfully
brought the war into the American home.
As a result of decreased time for information to reach the public, the amount of
time the DoD has to make decisions is reduced. Public outcry is a major influence on
DoD operations and media reports can affect the public’s opinion on DoD operations.
When media reports do not include all the facts or distort the truth the DoD may not have
the time to successfully educate the public on the nature of an operation, which may
result in an operation being prematurely cancelled (O’Boyle, 2000). Once the public has
a set view of a situation it becomes increasingly difficult to change that view. Many
myths have resulted in the misuse of the media to include the effect the Vietnam War has
had on Vietnam veterans. In this example several reports state Vietnam veterans are
more likely to commit suicide then the rest of the population, which is incorrect and
based on false statistics (O’Boyle, 2000). Even though the statistics are not substantiated
the myth remains, so the DoD must remain cognizant of news media effects.
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How the Military Adapted to News Media
During the time when colonial America was fighting for its independence,
military leaders began to see the use of the media as a tool to influence public opinion,
including the opinions of military personnel (Snyder, 2003). The colonial military took
control of any press who didn’t support their cause thus enforcing a positive influence on
public and troop support.
The luxury of news media control was diminished by a more substantial media
during the Civil War. As a result the military attempted to contain the flow of
information by controlling telegraph lines, restricting the media’s access to military
information, and physically shutting down any publisher who chose to distribute sensitive
or classified information (Snyder, 2003). During the Civil War military leaders realized
their lack of guidance on how to deal the media. After the Civil War military policy was
written on how military members should deal with the media. In addition, training was
provided to standardize interactions military members had with the news media. Further
efforts in dealing with the media and community resulted in the creation of a public
affairs office whose responsibility was relaying information between military leaders and
the media, or public.
WWI became a war that was covered under massive censorship. The Espionage
Act in 1917 and Enemy Sedition Act of 1918 made reporting disloyal information illegal.
President Woodrow Wilson issued executive orders which gave the military control of
the media. The military used this control to add a requirement for war reporters to gain
accreditation before being allowed access to the field. The accreditation ensured the
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reporter practiced nonbiased reporting and kept sensitive information from being
published. The government also used the media to increase public support for the war
producing a massive propaganda campaign against Germany (Snyder, 2003). Together,
media censorship and anti German propaganda ensured public support throughout WWI.
During WWII, self imposed censorship was employed. The self-imposed
censorship worked well due to the high level of patriotism (Aukofer and Lawrence,
1995). Due to some of the restrictions on reporters, during WWII the concepts for media
pools and imbedded reporting were created. Media pools came about because of the
limited availability of radio transmission facilities and abundance of media reporters
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). One reporter’s transmission would be broadcast by
several networks. Imbedded reporting came about with combat correspondents. Combat
correspondents were journalists who volunteered to enlist in the Marines and report as a
member of a military unit. Even with the new developments in war reporting, every
report was run through a censorship board before publication throughout the Second
World War.
The military initially gave in to the demands of the public and decided to
eliminate all forms of censorship during the Korean War, but eventually went back to
heavy censorship. Censorship for the Korean War included information that hindered the
security of military operations and military members, deteriorated moral, or embarrassed
the military or its allies (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). The latter two restrictions were
eventually eliminated in later wars because they were found to prevent free speech.
The Vietnam War, on the other hand, did not impose censorship throughout the
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war. The media’s coverage of the Vietnam War resulted in a severe reduction in public
support and consequentially resulted in the United States backing out of the war. Not so
much because of how the news media reported the war, but how the public realized the
cost of the war (Aukofer and Lawrence 1995). Public support was continually degraded
as government reports of progress in the war failed to coincide with news reports of
enemy actions. After the Vietnam War several DoD directives were developed
concerning the need to enhance public affairs. The media was to be given maximum
support in their efforts by the military, and the major combatant commands were
responsible for maintenance of this support.
However, the aid to the media was primarily considered a function of Public
Affairs personnel. Because of their reliance on the Public Affairs office commanders
hardly ever considered the needs of the media when devising military operations and
assumed any media needs could be handled independently by Public Affairs personnel
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). This resulted in the complete exclusion of all media for
the first two days of the Grenada conflict. Afterwards, a DoD National Media Pool
(DNMP) first conceived during the WWII was initiated to help ease logistical concerns
for including media in war planning. Military commanders misunderstood the intent of
the DNMP and thought it would eliminate any need to include the media in military
operations. The result was another initial exclusion of the news media from the conflict
in Panama.
Currently, DoD policy is better understood so military planners can do a better job
including the needs of the news media in military operations. However, new problems
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have surfaced. Conflicts are harder to cover with round the clock operations and
precision warfare. Media reporters can only be assured coverage if they deploy with the
military units conducting the attacks. Reporters independently covering a conflict may
become a liability to the military or are unlikely to witness any ongoing operations
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995).
DoD Information Disclosure Policy
One aspect of this research is whether or not too much information is being
released to the public causing an increase in network incidents. It is not the focus of this
research to determine causation, but it is helpful to review the DoD directives and
instructions pertaining to the release information within and outside the DoD. There are
three aspects of these documents of concern: U.S. information disclosure, foreign
information disclosure, and the process of information classification.
U.S. Information Disclosure
The discloser of DoD information to the U.S. public involves three key factors:
responsibility for the information, methods of disclosing the information, and DoD news
media support to ensure effective coverage of the information. Responsibility for
information disclosure lies with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs (ATSD(PA)), commanders, and Public Affairs personnel.
The ATSD(PA) advises the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on
matters concerning news media relations, public information, community relations, and
public affairs. ATSD(PA) is the final approval for all policies, plans, programs, and
actions that have operational implications. ATSD(PA) acts as the sole spokesperson and
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release authority for DoD information and audiovisual materials to news media
representatives. This includes establishing procedures for the administrative
management, activation, and direction of the DoD National Media Pool. Furthermore,
the ATSD(PA) supports DoD objectives and operations by developing policies, plans,
and programs to ensure free flow of news and information to the news media and general
public while maintaining national security constraints laid out in Executive Order 12958,
"Classified National Security Information," 1995.
DoDI 5400.14 requires the commander of the combatant command to include
public affairs needs in all DoD operations. The needs of the media must be considered
from the earliest stages of an operation. DoDI 5400.14 clarifies the needs of the news
media which include personnel, transportation, facilities, equipment, and communication
assets. With the help of Public Affairs a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) fulfills some of
these needs by acting as the interface between the media and U.S. military forces during
joint operations. JIBs aid the commander in establishing a healthy relationship with the
media and ensuring the media's needs are being met. Public Affairs tasks include
preparing reports for anticipated media questioning, setting policy, and preparing news
statements. Highest priority in media relations is placed on the training and
transportation of public affairs support. This is to ensure effective communication
between public affairs personnel and the news media. Support to the media should be a
continuous 24 hours a day task. The ultimate goal of Public Affairs actions are to
provide the media with as complete a picture of the operation as is possible without
hindering operations.
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The DoD is required to support and cooperate in programs involving relations
with the public, national associations, and non-governmental organizations consistent
with DoD Directive 5410.18 and DoD Instruction 5410.19. Methods to disclose
information include media pools, standard media reporting, written statements, public
announcements, and the like. The most direct method of gaining information is directly
from the source where the media is also allowed full access to DoD units and personnel
involved in an operation. The personal safety of correspondents must be considered
when being allowed on the battleground, but it is not a reason for excluding the news
media from military operations. Access to personnel does take exception to those DoD
personnel who need to remain anonymous for operational safety. In addition to news
reports and interviews the DoD also provides documentary products for release to the
news media produced by Joint Combat Camera.
Ground rules must be fully developed by the combatant commander and
understood for the civilian news media to abide by. The DoD established a set of
guidelines to help DoD personnel better understand what the needs of the media are and
how to establish a successful relationship. Figure 5 depicts the DoD media guidelines for
open and independent DoD operation reporting.
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Figure 5: Department of Defense Media Guidelines (JP 3-61, 1997)
Foreign Information Disclosure
Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 (1998) reinforces guidelines for U.S. media relations
as with standard DoD media policy. However, for certain operations foreign media can
be an effective way to affect opposition members to include its leadership. This is true
because DoD policy regarding the disclosure of information to foreign nations is separate
from local policy, such as the ability to conduct information operations. The three forms
of DoD information operations which affect foreign media are physiological operations
(PSYOP), civil military operations (CMO), and military deception operations. All three
forms of operations must work with each other to eliminate or minimize contradictions
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and maintain credibility with the agencies and populations of foreign nations and the U.S.
(JP 3.61, 1997).
CMO and PSYOP manipulate information to influence foreign agencies and
populations (JP 3-57, 2001; JP 3-53, 2003). CMO is meant only to positively influence
foreign populations, whereas PSYOP can have both positive and negative affects and is
meant to directly influence foreign governments, leadership, military members. etc.
Military deception as a tool used to create an advantage over a military adversary by
deliberately misleading their leadership with false information about U.S. forces (JP 3-58,
1996). Deception operations, PA, CMO, and PSYOPS should be coordinated through
one another prior to there use to ensure contradictory information isn’t released which
could discredit the operation. It is against DoD policy to misinform the U.S. public by
any means therefore military deception, PSYOPS, and CMO is strictly to be used against
non U.S. entities (JP 3-13, 1998).
DoD Information Classification Policy
The release of official DoD information to the public is limited only as necessary
to safeguard information in the interest of national security or other legitimate
governmental interest, as authorized by official government directives. It is DoD policy
that accurate and timely information is made available to the public, the Congress, and
the news media to help the analysis and understanding of defense strategy and national
security issues. Any official DoD information intended for public release that pertains to
military matters, national security issues, or subjects of significant concern to the
Department of Defense shall be reviewed for clearance by appropriate security review
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and Public Affairs offices prior to release (DODD 5230.9, 1996).
The primary method to prevent classified and sensitive information from being
reported is through the practice of "security at the source" where each individual is
responsible to ensure no classified information is disclosed. Other safeguards such as
media ground rules and formal security reviews are not to be relied upon for safeguarding
information (DoDI 5400.14, 1996).
Prior its release any information must be classified either top secret, secret,
confidential, or unclassified. To be considered for classification above unclassified the
information is required to include one or more of the following (Executive Order 12958,
1995):
1. Military plans, weapons systems, or operations.
2. Foreign government information.
3. Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or
methods, or cryptology.
4. Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential
sources.
5. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security.
6. United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or
facilities.
7. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating
to the national security.
On the other hand, in no case shall information be classified for the following reasons
(Executive Order 12958, 1995):
1.
2.
3.
4.

To conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error.
To prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency.
To restrain competition.
To prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in
the interest of national security.
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Other rules prevent certain information from being classified as well, such as basic
scientific research not clearly related to national security may not be classified.
Information may not be reclassified after it has been declassified and released to
the public under proper authority. However, if the information has not previously been
disclosed to the public, under proper authority information may be classified or
reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of
Information Act.
Another aspect of information security is the disclosure of classified information
through a collection of unclassified information. Several separate reports of information
which are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals
an additional association or relationship that meets the two following criteria:
1. The compilation of information meets the standards for classification under
Executive Order 12958, 1995.
2. The classified aspects of the compilation of information are not otherwise
revealed in the individual items of information.
DoD personnel, while acting in a private capacity and not in connection with their
official duties, have the right to prepare information for public release through non-DoD
forums or media. Clearance shall be granted if classified information is not disclosed, the
DoD interests in non-classified areas are not jeopardized, and the author accurately
portrays official policy, even if the author takes issue with that policy. Such activity is
authorized if:
1. No laws or regulations are violated.
2. Ethical standards and compliance with proper conduct are maintained (covered in
DoDD 5500.7 and DoD 5500.7-R).
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3. The preparation activities are not done during normal duty hours or with the use
of DoD facilities, property, or personnel except as authorized by DoDD 5500.7
and DoD 5500.7-R.
4. The author does not use official DoD information generally not available to the
public and which would not be released under DoD 5400.7-R.
It is the responsibility of the Director, Washington Headquarters Services in conjunction
with the heads of the DoD components to ensure compliance with the above directives.
All are needed to provide assistance and recommendations on what policy and security
implications may exist for information proposed for public disclosure. Whether or not
these constraints are enough to prevent sensitive information from causing network
attacks is a part of what this thesis is intended to discover.
Summary
The purpose of chapter II was to review current literature pertaining to network
attacks against DoD networks and review aspects of how network incidents could be
correlated to foreign news media coverage of DoD events. Computer technology
combined with networking technology has spread the ability to attack computer systems
from a few knowledgeable individuals with direct access to the system to just about
anyone with an internet connection. Currently the advantages of using the internet
outweigh the risks of network attacks. The risk of network attack can be reduced through
the use of information assurance tools such as IDS. However, attack detection is difficult
because networking technology wasn’t designed well for security and IDSs are limited in
resources and capabilities.
The problem of handling attacks is made worse by the difficulty in classifying
network attacks. Not being able to distinguish separate attacks consistently leads to
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misrepresentation of data obscuring possible valuable information. A better
understanding of what causes individual to perform network attacks could help create
more effective tools or revise DoD policy to reduce the number of attacks. Several
motivations exist for attacks conducted against DoD networks. DoD policy should both
limit the agitation of any negative motivations and increase the ability of the DoD to react
effectively against an attack.
DoD operations already consider the needs and the effect news media reports
have on those DoD operations. The extent of the affect media reports have on DoD
operations is unclear and under constant ridicule. The public has a right to know the
actions being conducted by their military, but the security of DoD assets needs to be
weighed carefully against the rights of the public. Similar circumstances revolve around
foreign media, however the U.S. military is not restricted in the use of information
operations against foreign nations. Therefore it would be possible to manipulate
information disclosed to foreign sources in an effort to improve DoD network defenses.
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III. Methodology Outline
Chapter Overview
This chapter details how the relationship between foreign news media reports
covering U.S. military events and network incidents against DoD systems is examined.
The first section describes the population of interest, the portion of the population
collected for this research, where the data are acquired, and how the data are manipulated
for the correlation test to be conducted. Next, definitions and validation of the dependent
variable (DoD network incidents) and independent variables (foreign news media reports)
are given. This chapter concludes with a description of the procedures used to answer the
investigative questions presented in Chapter I.
Data Collection
All data in this research are obtained from the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) and the DoD NetDefense. Each organization maintains an archive of data
for the past several years including the dates of this study, 1 January 2002 through 30
June 2004. Data from NetDefense was collected and transcribed into a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet suitable for statistical analysis. As is described below, data from FBIS had to
be analyzed and quantified using the IN-SPIRE software data mining tool before being
included in the MS Excel spreadsheet as well. The raw data from both sources are
considered For Official Use Only (FOUO) and are therefore not readily available to the
public.
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Table 2: Statistics on the Daily Number of FBIS Foreign News Media Reports for Each
Region

Total
Average
Std Dev

Near East
SubCentral
and South Saharan
The
West
Eurasia
China
East Asia
East Europe Asia
Africa
Americas
Europe
175618
140931
189773
166732
339623
110172
56941
141583
193
155
208
183
372
121
62
155
105
57
73
77
78
40
23
49

Table 3: Statistics on the Daily Number of DoD Network Incidents for Each Category
CAT1
Total
Average
Std Dev

CAT2
641
1
2

CAT3
584
1
2

CAT4
12552
14
21

115
0
1

CAT6
CAT7
116592
3013
128
3
47
13

Sample Population
Two groups of data will be analyzed in this research. The first group consists of
eight different regions of foreign news media reports (Central Eurasia, China, East Asia,
East Europe, Near East and South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, The Americas, and West
Europe). Media reports for each region are analyzed separately in an attempt to
maximize the scope of this research. Domestic news media reports were excluded due to
the lack of a comparable data source for domestic reports. The second group will consist
of six different categories of network incidents tracked and recorded by NetDefense
(unauthorized root access, unauthorized user access, unsuccessful attempted access,
denial of service, unauthorized probe, and malicious logic).
FBIS
FBIS offers an in-depth collection of translations and transcriptions of open
source information monitored worldwide on such diverse topics as military affairs,
politics, the environment, societal issues, economics, and science and technology. The
information is obtained by monitoring radio, television, press, periodicals, books and
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other sources of unrestricted information such as databases and gray literature. These
translations and transcriptions are known collectively as “FBIS Reporting.” Information
is collected from over 3000 foreign media sources from all over the world. All collected
data is translated and converted into basic electronic text format. The data collected is
available daily through the FBIS website, or in a bi-monthly update on CD ROM. The
latest FBIS bi-monthly updates for the past 30 months, January 2002 through June 2004,
will be used as the data source for the foreign news media reports.
NetDefense
The DoD-CERT is presently known as NetDefense, a branch of the Global
Network Operations Center, a component of Joint Task Force Global Network
Operations (JTF-GNO). The JTF-GNO mission is to protect, defend, and restore the
integrity and availability of the essential elements and applications of the Global
Information Grid. NetDefense works closely with the following government agencies
and non-profit organizations on a daily basis to improve incident tracking, technical
assistance, and corrective actions:
1. Army CERT (ACERT
2. Navy CERT (NAVCERT)
3. Navy Information Assurance
4. Air Force CERT (AFCERT)
5. Marine Corps NOSC (MCNOSC)
6. DISA CONUS GNSC
7. DISA PAC-RCERT
8. US CERT
9. DISA EUR-RCERT
10. DISA CENTRAL-RCERT
11. CERT Coordination Center
12. NIPC
13. CIAC
14. FedCIRC
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The information collected from the above listed government agencies are used to
populate the Joint CERT Database (JCD) which supplies the incident data for this
research. Each of the 14 offices communicates with the other offices to improve incident
response, however the JCD contains only DoD specific incident data.
When responding to an incident the ideal response for an incident response team
includes the following actions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Dispatch the team to the location of the incident.
Perform diagnostic tests on the system.
Preserve relevant data from the incident.
Restore the system to a reliable state.
Analyze system security.
Return the system to operation and review findings.

This process provides a standard method for each agency to both collect valuable incident
data and restore the system. In conjunction with the above process the Armed Services
CERTs have established guidelines for categorizing network incidents. The categories
range from one to eight and are explained in Table 1 on page 20. As was explained
earlier, categories five and eight are excluded from this research because they do not
pertain to the correlation being analyzed. Incident response is still a relatively new
process, however the efforts spent in the past decade has allowed processes and tools
used by incident response teams to detect and categorize incidents to improve greatly.
The timeframe of this thesis, January 2002 to June 2004, was chosen because the process
of catching and categorizing incidents is best during most recent times and it was the
largest sample that could be analyzed in the time allowed for this research.
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Data Manipulation
The amount of data used, a total of 1,321,373 foreign news reports and 137,219
DoD network incidents, in this research is too great to be handled in a reasonable amount
of time manually. Therefore two software analysis tools are required. One tool, INSPIRE, is used to quantify the total number of media reports and media reports
containing military events for each day, and subsequently week, of the study from the
FBIS archives. Furthermore, IN-SPIRE is able to analyze multiple documents to find
common words between those documents which can be used to determine the general
content of a set of reports. The other tool is Spearman's Rank Test performed on JMP 5.1
software to determine the statistical significance of any correlations between the data.
Data mining (IN-SPIRE)
SPIRE stands for Spatial Paradigm for Information Recognition and Exploration.
The IN letters are used to distinguish the windows version of the software from the UNIX
version. IN-SPIRE software can query multiple documents, group documents by content,
view the number of documents by a given timeframe, and retrieve a list of the most
frequently used keywords in a collection of documents. The two dimensional “Galaxy”
visualization display of the IN-SPIRE software, which visually groups a collection of
documents by content, is shown in figure 6. By using these functions of IN-SPIRE the
relationships of a collection of documents, that may not be immediately obvious through
manual observation, can be thoroughly explored.
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Figure 6: IN-SPIRE Galaxy Visualization Display
The Query tool (Figure 7) provides the ability to search for documents with
certain content in a dataset using three different techniques; Vocabulary Work Queries:
applying Boolean logic to vocabulary words, Exact Phrase Queries: searching with
controlled scope and case sensitivity, and Queries by Example: measuring proximity of
words in high-dimensional space. Using this tool is a good way to begin to locate a
group of documents that contain specific information in a dataset. By entering a query, a
concentration of documents of interest within a larger set of documents can be found
quickly. The Query tool also automatically selects and groups documents located by a
query so they can be easily separated and studied apart from the rest of the documents.
The Grouping tool is a convenient way to organize sets of documents for analysis. By
assigning documents to a group, query results can be rapidly retrieved and set operations
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can be used to examine the union, difference, and intersection of documents sets.

Figure 7: IN-SPIRE Query Tool Display
With the Time Slicer function (Figure 8) a datasets evolution can be explored
over time. The Time Slicer works by examining the timestamp in each document and
partitioning the dataset into discrete time slice views based on those timestamps.
Document counts for each slice of time, from years to minutes, are depicted in a
histogram. By interacting with this histogram, an individual can rapidly “slice” through
time and watch the information evolve over time, or simply determine the number of
documents at a certain point in time. The Time Slicer can partition a dataset only if
timestamps are available when the dataset is initially processed, with the granularity of
the time slices dependent on the granularity of the timestamp. In this research the
required slices of time will be in days.
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Figure 8: IN-SPIRE Time Slice Tool Display
The IN-SPIRE Gist tool (Figure 9) allows a user to see what words are used most
often by a set of documents. The Gist list is a sorting of words in order of the number of
documents each word is used in, then alphabetically. The Gist tool can also be used in
conjunction with the Query or Stopword tools. The Stopword function is used to remove
insignificant words from the analysis of a set of documents. Certain words are already
maintained in the Stopword list, such as “the”, “and”, “it”, etc., but additional words
determined to be insignificant to a particular analysis can be added with the use of the
Stopword tool. With the use of other tools or by itself a Gist is capable of enhancing the
exploration and understanding of a set of documents.
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Figure 9: IN-SPIRE Gist Tool Display
Spearman’s Rank Test
The nonparametric correlation test developed by Charles Spearman compares two
independent random variables to determine if a correlation exists. Unlike other
correlation tools, Spearman’s rank test works with data that is ranked relative to the entire
set of data for each variable. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, represented as “rs,”
provides a measure of correlation between each variable’s ranked datasets. The formula
for this measure of correlation is:
rs =

SS uv
SS uu SS vv

where
SS uv = ∑ (u i − u )(vi − v) = ∑ u i vi −

(∑ u i )(∑ vi )
n
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SS uu = ∑ (u i − u ) = ∑ u −
2

2
i

SS vv = ∑ (vi − v) = ∑ v −
2

2
i

(∑ u i ) 2
n
(∑ v i ) 2
n

ui = Rank of the ith observation in sample 1
vi = Rank of the ith observation in sample 2
n = Number of pairs of observations (number of observation in each sample)
A shortcut can be used to approximate rs when the number of ties in rankings for each
sample is small compared to n. The shortcut formula is given below:
rs = 1 −

6∑ d 2
n(n 2 − 1)

where
di = ui - vi (difference in the ranks of the ith observation for samples 1 and 2)
Using the shortcut formula it is easy to see when the rankings are identical the differences
between the ranks will be zero (note: the example below uses n=10 for demonstration
purposes only):
rs = 1 −

6∑ d 2
n(n 2 − 1)

= 1−

6∑ 0 2
10(10 2 − 1)

= 1− 0 = 1

Therefore a perfect positive correlation between sample sets of ranks is characterized by
a correlation coefficient of rs = 1. When the ranks indicate perfect disagreement the
result is rs = -1, or perfect negative correlation.
The concept of correlation implies that two responses are obtained for each
experimental unit. Rank correlation methods can be used to measure the correlation
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between any pair of variables regardless of the difference in measurements in the two
datasets. If two variables are measured on each of n experimental units, we rank the
measurements associated with each variable separately. When ties in rankings for each
sample set are found, each data point is given a value based on the average of the ranks
they would receive if they were unequal but occurred in successive order. For example,
if the 12th through 15th ranked measurements are tied each measurement will receive a
rank of (12+13+14+15)/4 = 13.75. After this is done we calculate the value of rs for the
two rankings. This value measures the rank correlation between the two variables.
A two tailed test for Spearman’s Nonparametric Test for Rank Correlation
includes a null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the two sample populations
being compared and an alternate hypothesis that a correlation does exist:
H0: ρ = 0
Ha: ρ ∫ 0

(Null Hypothesis)
(Alternate Hypothesis)

The value rs, the sample rank correlation, is the test statistics. The rejection region is
defined as |rs| > rs,a/2 where the value of rs,a/2 is determined through the use of the tstatistic when the number of paired observations is greater then 30. The equation used to
determine the test statistic, rs, for a/2 and n pairs of observations using the t-statistic is
given below.
rs =

t2
t2 + n − 2

The assumptions required for using Spearman’s rank correlation are:
1. Randomly selected sample of experimental units for each of the two variables
being measured
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2. Continuous probability distribution of the two variables being measured.
Variable Definitions

This section discusses the dependent and independent variables involved in the
research. Given the nature of this research, some leeway is required when assessing
reliability and validity. Mainly, both variables were taken from existing databases
instead of a designed experiment. Therefore, the data includes information that is
irrelevant which may conceal potentially significant results.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study is the number of incidents per week for the
six categories of incidents maintained in the JBS database. The definitions for each of
the categories are described earlier in Chapter II. The number of incidents is easily
determined from viewing the data separated by date and category in a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet. Category VIII (other) incidents could have been added to category VI
(probe or scan) data for this research because category VIII incidents are usually later
reclassified as category 6 (Svetlev, 2004). However, to ensure as high a level of validity
as possible the combination of category VIII incidents is not done for this research.
The incident data is grouped by the number of incidents per week where each
week starts on a Sunday and ends on a Saturday. The first week started on the first
Sunday of January 2002 and ended on the last Saturday of June 2004. Weeks are used
instead of days to account for any lag in dates assigned to each incident as well as other
potential variability in the sets of data. Also, using the more numerous weekly data helps
to comply with the Spearman’s Rank correlation assumption of continuous data.
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Independent Variable
The independent test group variable is the number of foreign news media reports
per week with U.S. military content for each of the eight regions of the world monitored
by FBIS. The independent control group variable is the total number of foreign news
media reports per week for each of the eight regions of the world monitored by FBIS.
The terms used in the query to identify and separate media reports with U.S. military
content are extensive but not all inclusive. The news media report data are grouped by
week in the same manner as the incident data to minimize possible lapses in the time to
produce reports when compared to incident data and other potential variability within the
sets of data.
Test Development

The null hypothesis (Ho) this research proposes is: no relationship exists between
the number of foreign news media reports covering military events and network incidents
against DoD systems. The alternative hypothesis (Ha) this research will either reject or
fail to reject is: a relationship does exist between foreign news media reports covering
military events and network incidents against DoD systems. The acceptable probability
the null will be rejected when it should not, a type I error or a, is usually at or below
0.01. This means that if an a=0.01 is used then 1 out of 100 tests should be expected to
result in a rejection of the null when the null hypothesis is true. Because there are almost
2500 individual tests performed for this research an a of 0.01 or higher would make the
possibility of a type I error too great. Therefore an a of 0.001 is a more reasonable figure
for this research making it unlikely for a significant amount of type I errors to occur.
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Research Questions
What is the nature of the relationship between foreign news media reports
covering military events and network incidents against DoD networks?
Investigative Questions
To better answer the research question, this research proposes to answer the
following investigative questions:
1. Do statistically significant correlations exist between different foreign regions
of news media reports involving U.S. military events and different categories
of DoD network incidents?
2. During what timeframes do the most statistically significant correlations
occur?
3. What is the content of the news media reports for the timeframes that are most
significantly correlated?
Correlation Analysis
A correlation test requires each dataset to be quantitative, therefore the FBIS data
needs to be converted into a quantitative form. The IN-SPIRE tool is able to enumerate
the number of media reports by date using the Time Slicer function. This feature
quantifies the news media data by enumerating the number of media reports occurring for
each day of the two and a half year span. The Time Slicer tool will also be used in
conjunction with the Query tool to enumerate the number of foreign news reports that
contain military events for each day of the study. A conceptual analysis is done with the
Query tool with the following list of terms to identify documents related in some way to
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the U.S. military:
"us military" or "u.s. military" or "usa military" or "u.s.a. military" or
"united states military" or "us air force" or "u.s. air force" or "usa air
force" or "u.s.a. air force" or "united states air force" or "us navy" or "u.s.
navy" or "usa navy" or "u.s.a. navy" or "united states navy" or "us
marines" or "u.s. marines" or "usa marines" or "u.s.a. marines" or "united
states marines" or "us army" or "u.s. army" or "usa army" or "u.s.a. army"
or "united states army" or "us dod" or "u.s. dod" or "usa dod" or "u.s.a.
dod" or "united states dod"
The documents found to have military content can then be exported to create a sub-set of
media reports. Again the Time Slicer tool is used to enumerate the number of media
reports with U.S. military content for each day of the 30 month span. Both the daily
news media and incident data sets are transformed into weekly data. The weekly
timeframe is used to take into account the variability created by delays in publishing and
correctly incident recording. All data, the number of incidents and media reports per
week, are consolidated into a single Excel worksheet for visual analysis.
Several statistical software programs are capable of handling the requirements of
this research; JMP 5.1 was the most readily available. The weekly incident data along
with the weekly news media data are transferred into JMP 5.1 from the Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet. The first tests are accomplished using the entire 30 months worth of weekly
data. JMP 5.1 is used to perform a Spearman's Rho nonparametric rank test using
multivariate analysis for each of the six categories of incidents against each of the eight
regions of media reports and the eight regions of media reports with military content for a
total of 96 tests.
The correlation tests between all foreign news media reports, regardless of
military content, will be used as a test group. A comparison of the correlation results
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between the news reports that did and did not reference the U.S. military will provide
insight into whether or not the news media’s coverage of military events has a more
significant correlation then media reports in general.
Next, a time series test of the weekly data will be analyzed for each set of
consecutive six month timeframes for the 30 months of data. There are 25 six month
timeframes for a total of another 2400 tests altogether. JMP 5.1 will be used to perform a
Spearman's Rho nonparametric rank test using multivariate analysis for each of the 25 six
month datasets comparing the six categories of incidents against each of the eight regions
of media reports and the eight regions of media reports with military content. The results
of the time series test will be compared with the overall correlation tests to determine
which correlations vary over time and by how much those correlations vary compared to
previous test results.
Finally, the IN-SPIRE Gist tool will be used to perform exploratory analyses and
find commonly used terms in the media reports for each month of the study by region.
The Gist tool will “get the gist” of a collection of documents used in a dataset by listing
the words commonly used between documents, ordered by the number of documents
each word is referenced in. IN-SPIRE also displays the number of documents each word
is found in. The terms found in the Gists of the entire 30 month period will be done for
each region for analysis and to use as a baseline to compare against common terms found
in each six month timeframe.
Due to computer speed and IN-SPIRE software limitations the media data could
only be analyzed one months and region at a time, so it was necessary to perform two
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successive Gists, as will be described below, to produce a list of common terms rather
then a preferable single Gist. Furthermore, several insignificant terms will have to be
added to the Stopword list to eliminate erroneous terms from the analysis. The additional
Stopwords will be determined by finding common terms from a few random
month/region document sets. Non key terms, such as adjectives or verbs, will be
manually selected for inclusion into the Stopword list. Once a list is created it will be
used for each analysis of news media reports.
A Gist of each month and region combination will be used to collect words
common to at least 90% of the documents for that month and region. The terms will then
be used to create a document of common terms for each month of each region. The result
will be 30 documents of common terms for each region, for both all inclusive media
reports and media reports covering the U.S. military, 480 documents altogether. The
documents of common terms can then be viewed with IN-SPIRE for the entire 30 months
of this study by region. At this point a regional Gist will be used to find the 20 most
common words are in all 30 months of data for each region. The 20 common terms do
not have to be common between every month, but the greatest number of months. The
result is a regional list of 20 terms common to at least 90% of the documents for each
month and region and common to the majority of months of that region.
A similar process is accomplished on only the months and regions found to have a
significant correlation using the six month timeframe Spearman’s Rank tests. The same
documents created above of 90% common terms are viewed with IN-SPIRE for each set
of months, by region, where a correlation was found to be significant in the 6 month
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timeframe analysis. The significantly correlated timeframes for a region will be
combined when they run in succession, are correlated to the same incident category, and
have the same type of correlation (positive or negative). Again, the second set of
common terms will be limited to the 20 most common key words for each set of months
and regions found to be significantly correlated to DoD network incidents. A manual
comparison between the 20 word lists and 30 month lists of key terms will be used to
better understand potential reasons for any significant correlations.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview

The purpose of this research is to determine what relationships exist between
foreign media coverage of military events and DoD network incidents through qualitative
codification and quantitative statistical analysis of data collected by NetDefense and the
Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS). This chapter presents the results of the
statistical and qualitative analysis to answer the three investigative questions described in
Chapter III. The results of the three research questions are presented in their own
sections below.
30 Month Timeframe Spearman Rho Tests

Based on a significance level of 0.001 and the 129 weeks of data, the rejection
criterion was to reject the null hypothesis if |rs|>0.2867. The results of the individual
Spearman tests have been tabulated and are displayed in Table 2 and 3 below. These
results indicate the null hypothesis should be rejected for a α of 0.001 in a two tailed test.
In all, 10 of the 96 rank correlations were determined to be statistically significant
with a significance level of 0.001. Six of the ten significant correlations involved media
related to military events. The average value of the six significant correlations between
network incidents and military related media, 0.4318, was larger then the average r value
of the other four correlations of all inclusive media, 0.3631.
Of the six types of the incident categories studied for the full 30 months, III, VI,
and VII (attempted access, probe or scan, and malicious code respectively), were found to
have at least one significant correlation. In addition, three of the eight regions for all
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inclusive media reports had at least one significant correlation: China, East Europe, and
Sub-Saharan Africa. Five regions for U.S. military related media reports had at least one
significant correlation: Central Eurasia, East Asia, East Europe, Near East and South
Asia, and West Europe. Both positive and negative correlations were found to be
significant in the results of the rank tests. With the exception of category VII incidents
for all inclusive media, each region or category maintained either positive or negative
correlations. Negative correlations were more common with six being negative and four
being positive.
Table 4: Results of Spearman Rho Test for Each Region and DoD Network Incident
Combination for All Media Reports from Jan 2002 Through Jun 2004
I
II
III
IV
VI
VII
Central Eurasia
-0.1216
0.1309 -0.0667 -0.0012 -0.0023 -0.1849
China
0.1702
0.0116
0.1201 -0.1559 -0.1760 0.3325*
East Asia
-0.0537
0.0291
0.0456
0.0973 -0.1530 -0.1083
East Europe
-0.0420 -0.0191 -0.4355*
0.1596
0.0382 -0.2783
Near East/South Asia
0.0319 -0.0159
0.0497 -0.0984 -0.2759
0.0606
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.2524
0.1689 -0.3498*
0.2095 -0.1980 -0.3345*
The Americas
-0.0611 -0.0802
0.1919 -0.0544 -0.0653
0.0823
West Europe
0.0975 -0.0383
0.0478 -0.0090
0.1292
0.0082
* rs values greater than the critical value 0.2865 at the 0.001 level for a two tailed test
Table 5: Results of Spearman Rho Test for Each Region and DoD Network Incident
Combination for Military Media Reports from Jan 2002 Through Jun 2004
I
II
III
IV
VI
VII
Central Eurasia
-0.2848
0.1467 -0.2502
0.1561 -0.0618 -0.5124*
China
-0.0583
0.0560
0.1281
0.0634 -0.2089 -0.1990
East Asia
-0.0561
0.1012
0.0215
0.1211 -0.3143* -0.3153*
East Europe
-0.1678 -0.0381 0.4535* -0.0137 -0.0164
0.1381
Near East/South Asia
-0.0436
0.0983 0.4753* -0.0870 -0.0433
0.1415
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.1135 -0.0780
0.0652 -0.0144 -0.0848
0.0352
The Americas
-0.0427
0.0511
0.1150 -0.0152 -0.1057 -0.2137
West Europe
0.0059
0.0895 0.5198*
0.0025
0.0456
0.2058
* rs values greater than the critical value 0.2865 at the 0.001 level for a two tailed test
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6 Month Timeframe Spearman Rho Tests

Based on a significance level of 0.001 and the 26 weeks of data for each six
month correlation test, the rejection criterion was to reject the null hypothesis if
|rs|>0.6034. The 2400 tests conducted for this part of the research made it inconvenient to
list the results of each test. Therefore, the results of the individual Spearman’s Rho tests
have been consolidated in Table 4 and 5 below to list each significant correlation
coefficient found and the months, region, and incident category in which it was
significant. None of the media-incident correlations other then those listed in table 4 and
5 for the six month timeframes exceeded the minimum rs value of 0.6034 and are
therefore not listed in Tables 4 and 5 below. These results indicate the null hypothesis
should be rejected for a α of 0.001 in a two tailed test.
In all, 39 of the 2400 rank correlations were determined to be statistically
significant with a significance level of 0.001. 28 of the 39 significant correlations existed
within media related to military events. Much like the 30 month correlations, the average
value of the 28 significant correlations between network incidents and military related
media, 0.6654, was slightly larger then the average r value of the other 11 all inclusive
media incident correlations, 0.6513.
Of the six types of incident categories studied for the six month timeframes, I, III,
VI, and VII (unauthorized root access, attempted access, probe or scan, and malicious
code respectively), were found to have at least one significant correlation. In addition,
every region but West Europe was found to have a significant correlation using all
inclusive media reports. However, every region but East Asia and The Americas were
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found to have a significant correlation using news media reports covering the U.S.
military. Both positive and negative correlations were found to be significant in the
results of the rank tests. With the exception of category III incidents for military related
media correlations in Central Eurasia, each region and incident category correlation
maintained either positive or negative correlations. Unlike the 30 month tests, positive
correlations were slightly more common with 24 significant correlations being positive
and 15 negative ones.
Table 6: Results of Spearman Rho Test for Each Region and DoD Network Incident
Combination for All Media Reports from Jan 2002 Through Jun 2004 in Six Month
Increments
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Table 7: Results of Spearman Rho Test for Each Region and DoD Network Incident
Combination for Military Media Reports from Jan 2002 Through Jun 2004 in Six Month
Increments

Significant Media Content

The results found in the content of the foreign media reports were divided into
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two sections. The first section is concerned with the words most significant to each
region for all 30 months. The second section displays the 20 most significant key terms
for those months and regions found to have the highest correlation significance.
Regional Exploratory Analysis
A list of Stopwords (Appendix A) was extracted from three test Gists using the
data from three randomly selected sets of news media reports: January 2002 Central
Eurasia, July 2002 China, and March 2004 The Americas. These reports were combined
and used to manually extract words insignificant to the intent of this research not already
included in the IN-SPIRE Stopword list. These words were then added to the existing
IN-SPIRE Stopword list.
Next a Gist was performed to determine what words were common to at least
90% of the media reports for a given month and region. This list was then used to
determine what words, from the lists of terms common to at least 90% of media reports,
were most common to all 30 months of media reports for each region. The number of
most common terms was limited to 20 to simplify a manual review. Each of the 20
words on a list was in at least 90% of the media reports for a given month and region, and
also one of the top 20 most commonly used key terms between those months for the
region. The resultant lists are shown in Table 6 and 7 below. Each list is ranked first by
frequency then alphabetically, so the most frequently used terms are first on the list in
alphabetical order and followed by the second most frequently used terms in a separate
alphabetical order.
Through manual review of Table 6 and 7 the common terms suggest the primary
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content of each region’s media are concerned with places within the region, politics, and
government. A few words which relate to the research being performed, such as
“internet”, “army”, “terrorism”, and “weapons” are present but do not appear to be any
more relevant to correlated regions then non-correlated regions.
Table 8: Results of the Media Content Analysis for All Media Reports from Jan 2002
through Jun 2004
Central
Eurasia*
cooperation
economic
english
foreign
leader
minister
ministry
moscow
national
political
president
russia
security
authorities
relations
vladimir
law
republic
federal
itar

China
audiences
beijing
chinese
economic
english
filing
foreign
hong
internet
kong
national
prc
president
root
taiwan
xinhua
minister
officials
political
united

East Asia*
computer
domestic
economic
editorial
english
foreign
internet
intervention
japan
korea
minister
national
officials
president
rok
seoul
tokyo
ministry
united
yonhap

East
Europe*
belgrade
democratic
english
european
foreign
minister
ministry
national
political
president
republic
security
social
union
law
opposition
economic
leader
internet
police

Near East &
South Asia*
economic
english
foreign
internet
leader
minister
national
political
president
security
war
arabic
iran
islamic
officials
policy
united
arab
israel
israeli

SubSaharan
Africa*
democratic
economic
english
foreign
french
internet
leader
minister
national
opposition
political
president
security
war
officials
republic
united
police
talks
nation

* Regions found to have at least one significant correlation
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The
Americas
economic
english
foreign
internet
minister
national
officials
political
president
security
spanish
united
trade
million
american
policy
ministry
social
leaders
police

West
Europe*
english
foreign
internet
minister
national
policy
political
president
security
united
european
french
paris
turkey
union
economic
german
leader
democratic
war

Table 9: Results of the Media Content Analysis for Media Reports with Military Content
from Jan 2002 through Jun 2004
Central
Eurasia*
moscow
russian
defense
political
president
security
united
force
foreign
minister
american
ministry
war
army
cooperation
national
armed
relations
territory
english

China
beijing
chinese
defense
english
force
foreign
internet
national
political
prc
president
security
united
war
weapons
bush
economic
policy
iraq
power

East Asia*
english
internet
japan
tokyo
united
defense
foreign
intervention
korea
national
war
korean
officials
security
computer
president
troops
rok
force
minister

East
Europe*
english
minister
political
war
army
defense
european
foreign
national
nato
president
security
united
force
ministry
troops
iraq
commentary
policy
internet

Near East &
South Asia*
english
foreign
internet
iraq
minister
political
president
security
united
war
bush
force
islamic
american
afghanistan
army
policy
washington
arab
iraqi

Sub-Saharan
Africa*
president
english
african
internet
minister
national
united
american
army
war
french
security
force
iraq
foreign
kenya
armed
terrorism
bush
political

The
Americas
english
foreign
internet
president
united
minister
national
security
war
washington
political
army
bush
force
troops
officials
spanish
defense
iraq
terrorism

West
Europe*
bush
foreign
minister
president
security
united
war
washington
internet
iraq
political
french
national
force
policy
army
english
american
iraqi
weapons

* Regions found to have at least one significant correlation
Significant Timeframe Exploratory Analysis
There were 2400 individual tests given the two sets of media reports for 8 regions,
6 incident categories, and 25 six-month timeframes. Below in tables 8 and 9 are the
results of the media content analysis for the months out of these 2400 tests found to be
significant. Each list contains 20 of the most commonly used key terms for a given
region and incident category during the months significant correlations were found. The
lists were compiled in a similar manner to the regional exploratory analysis above and are
described in Chapter III. Some of the timeframes were combined with one another
because they ran concurrently and had the same positive or negative correlation. When
this was the case, the most common key terms were found for the combination of months
found to be correlated. Because of this method the 39 correlations found for the sixmonth timeframes were consolidated into 21 correlations. Each of the 20 words on a list
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was in at least 90% of the media reports for a given month and region, and also one of the
top 20 most commonly used key terms between those months and regions. Each list is
ranked first by frequency then alphabetically, so the most frequently used terms are first
on the list in alphabetical order and followed by the second most frequently used terms in
a separate alphabetical order.
The lists were manually reviewed for their content and compared to the regional
media content lists in Table 6 and 7 above. No significant terms were distinguished
from the lists in Table 8 and 9 below from the lists in Table 6 and 7 above. In the lists of
Table 8 and 9 below a few unique terms were identified, but were not consistent
throughout the lists.
Table 10: Results of the Six Month Timeframe Media Content Analysis for All Media
Reports from Jan 2002 through Jun 2004
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Table 11: Results of the Six Month Timeframe Media Content Analysis for Media
Reports with Military Content from Jan 2002 through Jun 2004
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions of Research

This study performs both quantitative and qualitative analysis on a collection of
30 months worth of foreign news media reports from over 3,000 international sources
divided into eight separate regions, excluding the United States. The analysis was
designed to determine if a correlation existed between foreign news media reports
covering U.S. military events and network incidents against DoD networks. It also was
meant to help better understand the nature of such a relationship by determining what key
terms were used in the contents of the media reports found to be significantly correlated
with the news media reports. Significant correlations were found between several
combinations of regions and categories of network incidents for both news reports
covering the U.S. military and the entire collection of news reports. However, a greater
amount of more significant correlations were found when the news reports pertained to
military events. To help understand the nature of the correlation the most common terms
used within the thousands of foreign news reports were found. Unfortunately, the
correlations were only moderate and the key terms only led to a slightly better
understanding of such relationships. Therefore a correlation does exist, but a
determination of causation is left unanswered.
Review of Results

It is obvious a great deal more analysis is required to determine the true nature of
the relationship between foreign news media reports and DoD network incidents. The
three investigative questions were answered, but resulted in more questions then answers.
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The following sections review the results from the two types of tests conducted in this
research.
Correlation Tests
Clearly the data are not in complete agreement when we look at the results in the
differences between the six month timeframes and the regional analysis. I expected any
significant regional correlations for a region and incident category to contain a large
number of six month correlations for the same region and incident category. However,
only a few such cases existed. For military coverage report data there were three cases
were significant correlations existed between both the 30 and the 6 month analysis. Only
one case was found with all inclusive news data. In all cases the number of months found
to be significant through the six month tests did not correlate with the magnitude of the
correlation coefficient, at least not relative to each other. For example, Sub-Saharan
Africa news reports were found to be correlated with category III incidents positively for
the 30 month test and negatively for a six month correlation test. In addition, the number
and magnitude of six month correlations were much higher for the Near East & South
Asia region then the Central Eurasia region, but the 30 month correlation for Central
Eurasia was higher.
The validity of the decision to reject the null is improved when the total numbers
of correlations are examined in light of the significance level. I expected to see two or
three coefficients within the rejection region because the significance level was 0.001 and
there were 2496 test. This means about 2.5 tests should be the result of a Type I error. In
all, 49 tests resulted in a rejection of the null far exceeding the bounds of what may put

75

the decision to reject the null in question.
Looking back at the data the number of news media reports covering U.S. military
events per week for East Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and The Americas were quit low
and probably not suitable for rank correlation testing. Furthermore, the same case can be
made for the number of category I, II, and IV network incidents per week. This is
especially the case for category IV incidents were a large amount of zero values created
an especially high number of ties in ranking the data. Fortunately few correlations were
found to be significant involving the questionable data.
Media Content
The content of the news media reports were mostly of a political nature. There
were also several specific places of high interest which coincided with the region of
media reports. A few key words did stick out from the lists such as “internet”, “army”,
“weapons”, and “terrorism” but do not appear to be relevant to the nature of a correlation.
No consistent set of key words were found which might lead to a better understanding of
the cause of a correlation. The most significant finding, when looking at the results of the
news media content analysis, is the need for further refinement in how the exploratory
analyses are conducted.
Practical Implications

The significance of this research is not only how a correlation was shown to exist
between foreign news media coverage of U.S. military actions, but how most of the
correlations found were with Category III incidents (attempted access). Category III
incidents are one of the most prevalent types of incident, which is not surprising as it is
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the most simplistic for an attacker to perform and get away with. The key issue with this
type of attack is how it is used as a way to scope out a network's defenses. Attempts at
access are the first step in attaining access to a network and is therefore more likely to be
conducted in the same timeframe as a media report which is correlated with it. I am most
concerned with the lack of effective IDS in which case the true number of successful
attacks isn’t being recorded and a significant correlation may go unnoticed. However,
this is only a slight concern given this test was based on ranking the data. Even if there
were a significant number of successful attacks going unnoticed the relative nature of the
tests should have shown a significant correlation if one existed.
Because no direct causation could be determined, no actions can be made by the
DoD to better their defenses against network incidents. Once follow-on research is
accomplished and quantifies what the aspects of the DoD and foreign news media
relationships are, more direct actions can be specified to minimize network attacks.
Recommendations

This study was an expansion of previous research into how news media can be
used to better predict or defend against future network incidents. The amount of previous
research was small and its content was vague and based on somewhat erratic data. There
are multiple areas in this field of study for expansion and improvement.
News Media and Network Incident Relationship
The most notable recommendation is to narrow the focus of the news media
content from all inclusive and U.S. military coverage to several mutually exclusive yet
collectively exhaustive types of news content. The fact that significant correlations were
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found shows a relationship does exist between foreign news media and DoD network
incidents and should be explored further. A higher significance level was found in the
correlation coefficient with tests of foreign news media reports containing U.S. military
events then tests involving all inclusive foreign news media reports. This difference
shows how the separation of media reports containing military events has proportionately
more significantly correlated media reports then the entire collection of news media
reports.
Another consideration is the potential lag between published reports and incident
reporting and categorization. The same data could be reanalyzed taking into account lags
by matching incident data from each week with the previous week of media data, or vise
versa. Such tests would show how time affects the relationship. The lag tests could also
be used as evidence to support or refute theories of causation.
Looking at the moderate magnitude of the correlations, using the most common
key terms within the news reports was perhaps misleading. The true nature of a
correlation was much less common. A better way to go about the analysis would have
been to use IN-SPIRE, or a better data mining tool, to quantify the less frequently used
terms then use this list of terms to separate the media into meaningful yet separate
sections for analysis. A few suggested types of media content more specific to a
relationship are: forms of conflict, political viewpoints, methods of network attacks,
incident related news, and computer related news. Using this improved analysis
technique the relationship could then be further reduced to its true nature and justify
reason for a causal-comparative study to be performed.
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One last idea is to perform a more detailed correlation analysis by separating the
different DoD agencies network incidents. Such a study may show how an agency is
being singled out for attacks, or how certain news media is correlated more to certain
DoD agencies. This may, however, prove difficult with limited incident data.
Text Mining
The techniques used to extract the news media content in this research were less
then ideal. The obvious solution would be to gain access to more powerful data mining
tools and computer systems. If this is the case, then it may be possible to view more then
a couple months’ worth of media reports for a single region at a time. To be able to view
the set of reports as a whole would drastically improve the ability to determine how to
divide the media into separate meaningful sections. In the absence of such tools, one can
learn from the techniques used in this research.
The Stopwords tool was necessary while using IN-SPIRE software to remove an
abundance of insignificant words cluttering the list of key terms found for a set of reports.
Several stopword lists could be combined from the months of reports to eliminate the
insignificant information and improve the results of the Gist tool. A thorough use of
these tools to find less significant key words may prove beneficial when separating a set
of documents into separate yet all inclusive sections.
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Appendix A
Additional Stopwords used for Media Content Analysis:

unclassified report prohibited material owners permission contain copyright fbis
dissemination copying copyrighted jan feb mar apr may jun jul aug sep oct nov dec text
gmt translated source description January February March April May June July august
September October November December agency government news information main
time told people according country transcribed deputy head situation www affairs service
independent international newspaper including countries official meeting press
correspondent excerpt provided company region forces means chief development council
special interfax office former omitted set held visit world decision website passage
department support day version local central tv following television media reports
received prime level issue site system presenter devoted district daily operation article
signed course party representatives control similar issues result regional agreement
results reported called question cent data staff radio current major noted percent
discussed director yesterday opinion taking five avn written position intended past days
recently process conditions measures prior help interview ago believe air example times
plans particular various total start discuss near basis experts organization left purposes
speaking actions months session content increase services found serious expected
organizations based stressed carried period operations city companies consent decided
market secretary reason announced recent soon term six activities believes life paper anti
controlled redistribution centre plan view close started programme change difficult
reserved half

line week holding entitled real planned html sent isp expressly

republication currently channel north ready units equipment expressed representative
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sources events statement involved efforts video hold building addition attention station
documents terms due meet aimed technical center industry created officers house stated
met matter third considered role assembly words prepared added details deputies aid
regions adopted mass seen simply hand internal parties changes document earlier amount
questions form leave led reached action moreover Wednesday Monday Tuesday
Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday especially saying increased beginning entire paid hope
bilateral activity despite status personnel using approved true resources return effect
brought draft interior remain sector single pro field possibility private month program
create connection confirmed premier bodies list provide audience owned live southern
established managed spokesman account moment agencies final project speaker arrived
receive decisions heads specialists trying plant stock free accordance agreed seven reach
reasons name previous person step top board deal natural experience potential specific
active scale ensure views immediately organized issued participation sign carrying
majority conducted talk settlement developing exchange regard headquarters task
complex facilities assistance act implementation training whom carry consider
community agree develop reform stage laws executive meetings march figures passed
appointed influence resolution investment presence positive closed bring rate understand
property agreements idea concerned east discussion demand planning prospects
particularly cut registered hours happened growth mean completely remains common
leading base headed date space structures run late peace participants coming movement
look supreme supply changed viewpoint ties nor operating land developed health lost
included industrial northern probably proposed meanwhile declared purpose call concern
concerning charge commercial systems towards hard subject respect billion join elite
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event allow speak opportunity makes projects begin rule supported personal finally
positions submitted purchased team url vice town proposals significant effective lead
pressure tasks completed detained regarding direct attempt try move talking language
living additional figure cost progress stop creation launched include calls candidates acts
highly structure intends eight ru west south importance worth note formed outside tried
ones explained spent impossible described independence mutual incidentally complete
located appeal key statements mission built continuing proposal responsible instance unit
guard range comment decree existing accused begun extremely steps st via allowed
forced informed customs directorate rise principle promised normal related intend
responsibility
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